Only
Connect
Only connect!
That was the whole of her sermon. Only connect the prose and the passion,
and both will be exalted, and human love will be seen at its height. Live
in fragments no longer. Only connect, and the beast and the monk, robbed
of the isolation that is life to either, will die.
from Howard's End by E.M. Forster
Links are the
signature characteristic of networks. Connections always have been important
to organizations, but comparatively speaking, until now, people have had limited
links. In the past, the physical connections among people have been relatively
scarce and costly. Both to maintain control and in the interests of efficiency,
hierarchy and bureaucracy minimize connections.
Links are
not new in networks but their variety and intensity are new, as is their
use as a dominant design principle. New media that instantly circumnavigate
our small planet bring with them geographically distributed organizations,
virtual teams-and overloaded people.
There is something
entirely new wrapped around the planet-a way for one person to communicate
with many at a very low cost, regardless of where they are in time or space.
Spontaneously and with little deliberate planning, a global conversation and
information freeway has erupted in less than a decade that makes next-door
neighbors of people in Pottstown, Pennsylvania, Bangalore, India, and Johannesburg,
South Africa. No single organization owns the Internet, the earth's interconnected
computer network of networks. No authoritative hierarchy governs it. And it
is growing faster than ever predicted.
The Internet
is an electronic technology that makes it possible for people to "only
connect." The Age of the Network is all about the ability to develop
relationships that cross space and time. Geography needs no longer be a barrier
to people's capacity to work together and form communities.
The technology
network supports the people network. Those who regard the technology
alone as the network miss the point. Networking means people connecting with
people, which they do whether they're sitting around a conference table, pressing
their ears to the phone, staring at a computer, or standing by the fax machine.
The really fascinating
technology story occurs when people engage at their deepest levels, solving
problems, describing experiences, and allowing their "creative juices
to really flow."
VirusNet
Self-Organizes
On November 2,
1988, a graduate student at Cornell University released the first big virus
on to the Internet. Launched at 5:01:59 PM on Tuesday, the "Internet
Worm" invaded a certain type of operating system on computers attached
to the Internet-from Lincoln Labs and the National Supercomputer Center to
Boston University and the University of California at San Diego. It shut down
many big research sites and universities within the first hour.
Instantly, a
spontaneous, geographically distributed, all-volunteer army of specialists,
which we call "VirusNet," erupted to work round the clock to stop
the worm, which they did in barely a day's time. Not before, however, headline
news had alarmed the public that World War III might be upon us.
VirusNet is a
classic study in the impromptu development of a laser focused, mach speed,
emergency rescue network that achieved its objective-just like that. It demonstrates
all five teamnet principles:
- VirusNet's
clear purpose was to kill the worm.
- Everyone involved-perhaps
a dozen at the core with scores and ultimately hundreds more minor players-was
an independent member. If any single person left, VirusNet still
survived.
- They communicated
like crazy. They were richly linked with intense face-to-face encounters.
Countless phone calls skidded down lines of pre-existing trust. And the
physical Internet played its part: On the 95 percent of it not affected
by the worm, people sent messages, swapped files, called up programs, and
accessed databases.
- There were
no bosses. Multiple leaders brought their expertise to bear at critical
moments. No single person solved the problem; everyone together did.
- By the time
it was over, VirusNet engaged all the levels: the hierarchy and the
"lower"-archy. While the computer labs hacked out the solutions,
the press was in the office of MIT's Vice President of Information Services.
Within a week, the previously anonymous computer labsters who cracked the
code found themselves in a debriefing with officials from the National Institute
of Standards and Technology, the Defense Communications Agency, the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Department of Energy, the Ballistics
Research Laboratory, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National
Computer Security Center.
While destructive
viruses have been loose in the computer world for at least a decade, this
was the first networking worm. It posed as an imposter to linked computer
systems, and once inside, went on to "propagate copies of itself."
Strange as it may seem, it was a relatively "nice" worm. It only
attacked computers running a specific operating system called Unix, the Bell
Labs invention that blew open the potential for open systems and large-scale
electronic networking.
Although the
worm did not harm data or reveal any passwords, it did cause quite a ruckus.
First, it had no business invading other machines to begin with. Once it arrived,
it generated garbage throughout the whole system. It had to be stopped.
Was it an accident
that Robert T. Morris, Jr., the Cornell student who perpetrated the worm and
eventually received one year's probation, along with 400 hours of community
service and a $10,000 fine for his crime, chose the eve of the annual face-to-face
meeting of Unix experts in Berkeley, California, to release it? This rare
convergence brought together many of the world's best Unix minds. Related
or not, the network as a whole had access to how to stop the worm in the snap-of-a-finger
time of 36 hours.
The worm wasn't
so much discovered by anyone as it was detected by many people at the same
time. They figured out that it was a "worm" by putting their heads
together. Within an hour of its launch, someone saw something strange on an
MIT computer, but couldn't figure out what it was. The first message calling
it a virus came from someone at NASA Ames Research Center nine hours after
its release, saying the worm had attacked machines at University of California
at Berkeley, University of California at San Diego, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, Stanford, and Ames. An hour later, someone at Harvard suggested
that the worm was an Internet problem. Within the next hour, more heads went
up at separate sites at MIT, Berkeley, Brown, and SRI International.
Immediately,
different groups of people in different labs went to work, forsaking sleep,
food, and showers. Each lab went after the part of the problem that it knew
best how to solve.
- One discovered
a bug in the worm program that could be used against it.
- Another noticed
that the worm crawled in through a wide open door, a particularly vulnerable
bit of computer code, and published a way to close it by midnight of the
day after the worm's launch.
- Others replicated
the worm on a "trenched" (isolated) machine, set off from the
Internet so that it only could worm across its own experiment.
- Even Morris
himself reportedly tried to kill the worm. According to one account, he
regretted his act almost immediately and, within a few hours of the release,
asked a friend to post his solution to a computer bulletin board. However,
no one could access it because the computer systems that needed to see Morris's
message were the very ones that were down.
The weary labsters
communicated continuously and extensively among themselves about their progress-both
on the phone and through other network gateways not shut down by the worm.
Occasionally, they went to meals. In all, only eight days passed until every
affected computer was back up and running, with no more than 4000 machines
infected in total, about five percent of the 80,000 then connected to the
Internet (in mid-1994, 2,200,000 machines are connected).
Press
and Perceptions
Released on Tuesday,
the worm problem had been solved by the time MIT hosted the first national
press conference on Friday. The reporters were disappointed.
They had hoped
for a much bigger story, perhaps one in which all the world's computers had
been wiped out in a single moment, "that we were ... moments away from
World War III, or that there were ... large numbers of companies and banks
hooked up to `MIT's network,' who were going to be really upset when Monday
morning rolled around," wrote Jon Rochlis and Mark Eichin in their first-hand
account of cracking the worm code. "My greatest fear was that of seeing
a National Inquirer headline: `Computer Virus Escapes to Humans, 96
Killed,'" one labster said.
The media also
was disappointed with the virus's lack of visuals, having to settle for people
"looking at workstations talking `computer talk.'" Much of the news
is invisible to the camera's eye in the Age of the Network.
In fingering
Morris as the chief suspect on the morning of the press conference, The New
York Times reported the great irony of this story: "The enemy is
us," in Rochlis and Eichin's words. It wasn't a terrorist operating out
of some distant, strange land, or a corporate blackmailer, or a disgruntled
worker who perpetrated the crime. It was an academic graduate student in computer
science at a respected American institution whose father Robert T. Morris,
Sr., was the chief scientist at the National Computer Security Center.
While the worm
did very little real damage, it revealed the vulnerability of the Internet
at the same time as it unveiled its strengths. Chief among these is the design
of the Internet, founded on the principle of "decentralizing defenses."
Don't protect the network; protect the individual nodes on the network.
Which tightly
couples to the final networking lesson brought to us by the worm:
In a complex,
unpredictable world, diversity is the great armor of the whole fabric.
Since the virus
only attacked one type of computer operating system, few sites were put out
of business completely. By having many different types of computer systems,
the labs were safer than if they were all the same.
Diversity is
safer, as well as smarter
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